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THE SEC, THE AUDIT COMMITTEE RULES, AND 
THE MARKETPLACES: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND THE FUTURE 
HELEN S. SCOTT∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “Audit Committee Rules” (the Audit Rules) comprise an integrated 
set of regulations issued by the Securities Exchange Commission (the SEC), 
the marketplaces, and the accounting profession.1 The genesis of the Audit 
Rules was a determination by the SEC that the quality of the financial data 
reported by companies with publicly traded securities was susceptible to 
distortion (intentional or otherwise) in response to the pressures of the new, 
increasingly volatile and demanding marketplace.2 The SEC further 
determined that altering the information flow and relationships within a 
company and between the company and its outside auditors could minimize 
this potential for distortion.3 This change focused on the Audit Committee of 
the Board of Directors. Several different pieces of the overall puzzle, 
however, had to be changed to do this: the structure and function of the Audit 
Committee of the Board of Directors, the applicable independence standards 
or the company’s outside financial auditors, the relationship between the 
Audit Committee and the auditors, and the public disclosure of this 
 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Co-Chair, Listing & Hearing 
Review Council of The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (NASDAQ). I chaired the Council subcommittee 
charged with developing recommendations to the Board of Directors of NASDAQ regarding its 
response to the recommendations regarding audit committee listing standing. Those recommendations 
ultimately resulted in the adoption of the NASDAQ rules I discuss in this paper. I would like to thank 
Elazar Guttman for his valuable and diligent research assistance. I also gratefully acknowledge the 
boundless patience and considerable insight of Sara Bloom, Associate General Counsel, NASDAQ. 
 1. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Release No. 34-42266, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 86,230 (1999-2000 Transfer Binder) (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Final Audit Rules Releases]. See 
also SEC Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU section 380 (SAS 61); Independence 
Standard Board Standard No. 1, available at http://www.cpaindependence.org (last visited Oct. 24, 
2001) (Publications/ISB Final Pronouncements/Standard No. 1); New York Stock Exchange Listed 
Company Manual § 303.01, available at http://www.nyse.com/search/search.html (last visited Sept. 
29, 2001) [hereinafter NYSE Manual]; The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., Marketplace Rules 4200, 
4310, 4320, 4460, available at http://secure.nasdr.com/wbs/NETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4; 
&xinfo=/goodbye.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2001) [hereinafter NASDAQ Rules]. 
 2. Arthur Levitt, “The ‘Numbers Game,’” Remarks at the New York University Center for Law 
and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998 (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Levitt Speech]. 
 3. Id. 
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information flow and review of the company’s financial statements. 
Financial reporting defects are not new. Like many marketplace 
problems, financial reporting issues change in response to market conditions. 
In the recent past, the securities markets have seen some quite dramatic 
changes: the appearance of completely new industries, increasing numbers of 
actively participating investors, and enhanced technology. New industries 
can present our financial reporting system with challenges as new standards 
are developed or old standards are adapted to fit new transactions and new 
concepts.4  
The presence of large numbers of active, technologically capable 
investors and the reduced costs of securities transactions has resulted in 
increased market volatility.5 Investors are now able to buy and sell a stock in 
moments, if not seconds, accelerating the price movements that result from 
new information entering the marketplace. Many investors appear to feel that 
once a stock starts to move lower, the risk of staying in is not worth taking in 
light of the ease of entry and exit. It’s better to get out and get back in later. 
With reduced transactions costs, this increased trading activity may even 
appear to be economically rational.6 
In addition, there are multiple new sources of information about 
companies available to the investor.7 This increase in available information 
has changed investor expectations as to a company’s or a stock’s 
performance and caused extremely rapid price changes from any variation 
from those expectations. This “democratization” of the research and analysis 
 
 
 4. See, e.g., Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, Office of Chief Accountant, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, to Ms. Arleen Thomas, Vice President, Professional Standards 
and Services, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, re: 2000 Audit Risk Alert to the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/ 
staffletters/audrsk2k.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2001). 
 5. See, e.g., Datek homepage, available at http://www.datek.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2001); 
etrade homepage, available at http://www.etrade.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2001); National Discount 
Brokers, available at http://www.ndb.com/aboutNBD/tradingfeatures/commissionschedule (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2001) (“With NDB’s TLC—Trade at Lower Commissions Program, you can make 
multiple trades of the same stock, on the same side of the market, on the same day, and pay full 
commission only once—on the initial trade. Each additional same side same day trade costs you just 
$3.95.”). 
 6. But see, e.g., Ronald L. Johnson, Day Trading: An Analysis of Public Day Trading at a Retail 
Day Trading Firm (Aug. 9, 1999) (North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) 
Report), available at http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/scripts/fu_display_list.asp?ptid=16 (last visited Sept. 
29, 2001). See also Do Day Traders Make Money, available at http://investorhome.com/daytrade/ 
profits.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2001) (citing other relevant sources therein). 
 7. For example, with the effectiveness of Regulation Fair Disclosure in October 2000, see 17 
C.F.R. Pts. 240, 243 and 249 (2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm, 
investors are now able to access company conference calls and webcasts previously available only to 
analysts and other market professionals. 
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function brings with it both good and bad news. Investors, on one hand, 
provided with access to information can and do make informed investment 
decisions without the need for the intervention of intermediaries and can do 
so almost instantaneously. 
On the other hand, in this environment the pressure on public companies 
to conform to, if not exceed, market expectations with respect to financial 
performance has become intense. Marketplace punishment, if not reward, is 
quick and severe when a company fails to meet expectations.8 The pressure 
on senior management is particularly intense, as both their personal wealth 
(in the form of stock performance-related compensation measures and the 
value of their stock options) and their jobs may be on the line. 
In September 1998 Arthur Levitt, then Chairman of the SEC, gave a 
speech at New York University’s Center for Law and Business, describing 
some of the financial reporting problems the SEC had been seeing as a result 
of the new marketplace environment, which he described generally as the 
“management of earnings.”9 Such management may undermine the integrity 
of the financial data on which the markets so heavily rely. And so the SEC 
decided to change the rules of the game, and the Audit Rules were the result.  
II. BACKGROUND: THE SEC, THE MARKETPLACES, AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  
The SEC has a long tradition of relying on marketplace listing standards 
to impose corporate governance requirements, including those involving 
audit committees: 
Since the early 1940s, the Commission, along with the auditing and 
corporate communities, has had a continuing interest in promoting 
effective and independent audit committees. It was, in large measure, 
with the Commission’s encouragement, for instance, that the self-
regulatory organizations first adopted audit committee requirements in 
the 1970s.10 
 
 
 8. Lawrence M. Fisher, Oracle Posts Earnings Growth of 31% for Latest Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 1999, at C1 (“Shares of the Oracle Corporation dropped sharply in after-hours trading this 
evening after the company reported first-quarter earnings that met the published consensus estimate of 
analysts but fell short of the whisper number.”). 
 9. Levitt Speech, supra note 2. Examples of such earnings management cited by Chairman 
Levitt included creation of a future earnings cushion by deliberately overstating restructuring charges, 
the misuse of accounting techniques in connection with acquisitions, the establishment of “cookie jar 
reserves” to use for evening out future earnings, premature revenue recognition on a sale, improper 
deferral of expenses and misuse of the concept of materiality. Id. 
 10. SEC Release No. 34-41987 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,209 (1999-2000 Transfer Binder) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Indeed, Chairman Levitt invoked the informal, but powerful, influence the 
SEC exerts on the marketplaces in his September 1998 speech announcing 
the establishment of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees.11 
The SEC has utilized this technique to implement policies in fields where 
it either lacks direct statutory authority to regulate or where its authority is 
questionable.12 This approach has sometimes been referred to as “regulation 
by raised eyebrow.”13 Because the SEC is not exerting its regulatory power 
in utilizing this approach, it does not violate limitations on its authority. 
However, this tactic has not been wholly free of debate.  
Traditionally, the power to govern the internal affairs of corporations lies 
mainly with the states. Every state may enact general corporation laws that 
govern the formation and maintenance of an entity’s corporate status. Those 
laws also include rules that govern the behavior of the corporate management 
and the rights of the shareholders. While the federal government probably 
has the power to create federal corporations law that would apply to 
corporations engaged in interstate commerce,14 it has so far declined to do so. 
However, over the years, there has been substantial federal involvement in 
specific areas of corporate law. Although there is no federal law that deals 
directly with corporate governance in general, many federal statutes affect 
numerous aspects of corporate governance.15  
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as 
sweeping as they were, did not federalize corporation law. The legislative 
history reveals that Congress had no such intent. The Conference Report to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,16 contains the following passage:  
 
 
(Oct. 7, 1999) [hereinafter the Audit Rules Release]. 
 11. “As part of this comprehensive effort to address earnings management, the New York Stock 
Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers have agreed to sponsor a “‘blue-ribbon’” 
panel . . . Within the next 90 days, this distinguished group will develop a series of far-ranging 
recommendations intended to empower audit committees . . . .” Levitt Speech, supra note 2, at 7. 
 12. See Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 571 
(1984). See also Patrick Moyer, The Regulation of Corporate Law by Securities Regulators: A 
Comparison of Ontario and the United States, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 43, 56 (1997). 
 13. See The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Schwartz, 
supra note 12, at 571). 
 14. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. 
REV. 783, 801 (1994). 
 15. The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216d (1988), the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982), and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982), all govern the election and make up of the board of directors in their respective 
industries, and stipulate other rules concerning corporate governance within those industries. While 
this list provides the more expansive examples, it is not conclusive.  
 16. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1838, at 35 (1934). See also S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 10 (1934) (denying 
that the Exchange Act authorizes SEC interference in corporate management). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/4
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The House bill does not contain a provision corresponding to that 
contained in subsection (d) of section 13 of the Senate amendment 
providing that “nothing in this title shall be construed as authorizing 
the Commission to interfere with the management of the affairs of an 
issuer.” This provision is omitted from the substitute as unnecessary, 
since it is not believed that the bill is open to misconstruction in that 
respect.17 
However, the SEC has never read this as an absolute bar on its ability to 
implement policies that might affect corporate governance. The SEC long 
behaved as if rules promulgated in furtherance of some declared purpose of 
the Act were within its authority, regardless of the effect the rules had on 
corporate governance. While this belief went unchallenged for a long time, it 
was more a result of the SEC’s prudential reluctance to promulgate rules that 
directly implicated internal corporate governance than any judicial 
acceptance of the position. That practice lasted until 1988, when the SEC 
adopted Rule 19c-418 which was rebuffed by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia.19  
In The Business Roundtable v. SEC,20 the court denied the SEC authority 
to prohibit the listing of classes of common stock with a reduced per share 
vote of common shareholders compared to a different, less widely held class. 
Although the reduction would have required the affected shareholders’ 
approval, the SEC sought to discourage such actions as contrary to the 
welfare and best interest of public shareholders generally.21 The SEC 
grounded its authority in the Exchange Act’s grant of power to regulate the 
proxy process,22 and in the Act’s purpose of protecting investors and the 
public interest.23 The court, while agreeing with the SEC’s reading of the 
purposes of the Exchange Act, held that Rule 19c-4 went beyond the SEC’s 
delegated authority under the Act.24 Relying on legislative intent25 and 
 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. 17 C.F.R. § 240-19c-4 (1991). 
 19. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 411. 
 22. Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988), which provides in pertinent part: 
“It shall be unlawful for any person, . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors, to solicit . . . any proxy.” Id. 
 23. Securities Exchange Act §§ 6(b)(5), 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5) (1988), 78o-3(b)(6) 
(Supp. II 1990).  
 24. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410-12. 
 25. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court precedent,26 the court reasoned that the Act never intended to 
interfere with internal corporate management and that it only authorized the 
SEC to regulate the procedural aspects of shareholder voting.27 Therefore, the 
court invalidated the Rule because it sought to regulate substantive corporate 
behavior by limiting what shareholders can agree on.28  
The decision made it clear that any SEC rule must steer clear of 
“corporate governance as a whole.”29 However, in dictum the decision 
acknowledged the possibility that the marketplaces could effect such policies 
by creating listing requirements that directly affect corporate governance.30  
Although listing requirements are subject to SEC review and approval, 
the SEC’s power to disapprove them is quite limited. Individual exchanges 
are not considered to be functioning as regulatory bodies when dealing with 
issuers who request to be listed.31 Rather, they are functioning as private 
entities. Individual exchanges only exert regulatory power when regulating 
their members, such as traders and brokers. Under those circumstances, the 
SEC must review and may approve such actions only if they “are related to 
the purposes of the Act.”32 However, in the area of listing standards, the 
marketplaces function as private entities, and the SEC standard of review is 
limited to ensuring that such actions do not interfere with the purposes of the 
Act.33 This difference in the legislative standards allowed the SEC to 
implement its corporate governance policies by convincing the individual 
marketplaces to adopt them as listing requirements.34 
Some commentators have questioned the wisdom and effectiveness of 
delegating implementation and enforcement of the SEC’s corporate 
governance agenda to the marketplaces.35 Ultimately, the only action a 
marketplace can take against a violator is to de-list its stock. De-listing 
 
 
 26. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 27. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413-14. 
 28. Id. at 415. 
 29. 905 F.2d at 413. 
 30. Id. at 414. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. At least one commentator has criticized the court’s adoption of a limited standard of review 
for listing requirements proposed by the individual exchanges. See Douglas C. Michael, Untenable 
Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 BUS. LAW. 
1461 (1992). The criticism stems from the court’s interpretation of the statutory language and the 
legislative history. The court understood them as implying differing standards of review depending on 
whom the rule is regulating. The article argues that the legislative intent was to reign in the power of 
individual exchanges to regulate issuers by subjecting it to SEC approval. Once this premise is 
accepted the variability of the Acts terminology is insignificant. Id. at 1462-63. 
 35. See generally John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committee More Effective, 54 BUS. 
LAW. 1097 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/4
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decreases the liquidity of the stock, by decreasing its trading volume and 
limiting the number of market professionals, particularly member firms of 
the marketplaces, who trade in it. While this hurts the issuer, the 
marketplaces themselves, their members, and the holders of the de-listed 
stock also suffer. The marketplaces compete directly and fiercely for new 
listings. This could create a disincentive in the marketplaces to de-list for 
violation of a qualitative listing standard. 
The SEC’s oversight responsibilities act as a brake on the marketplaces’ 
ability to attempt to gain advantages in attracting listings by using corporate 
governance standards as competitive tools. In connection with the Audit 
Rules, the SEC made it quite clear that it expected all major markets36 to 
adopt similar schemes and that these rules do not give rise to any competitive 
edges.37 
The marketplaces have complex and multilayered relationships with the 
SEC. Even in areas where the SEC has no direct authority, like the 
promulgation of corporate governance rules, it is risky for a marketplace to 
resist strong SEC suggestions.38 The marketplaces usually have several 
issues pending for the SEC at any one time, including a variety of listing 
proposals, trading rule changes, and disciplinary matters. While there is no 
overt “linking” of issues by the SEC, a marketplace is not likely to take a 
strong position in opposition to the SEC’s “raised eyebrow,” particularly 
when the SEC is exerting similar pressure on all the marketplaces. 
The Audit Rules involved a well-orchestrated series of events. First, the 
SEC announced the formation of The Blue Ribbon Committee on the 
Effectiveness of Audit Committees (the BRC),39 to be funded by the 
 
 
 36. At the time the Audit Rules were adopted, the American Stock Exchange had been acquired 
by the NASD and was run in conjunction with NASDAQ. The functions and governance of those 
markets has since been severed. 
 37. Arthur Levitt, Remarks Before the Conference on the Rise and Effectiveness of New 
Corporate Governance Standards, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, N.Y. (Dec. 12, 
2000) [hereinafter Levitt Governance Speech], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speecharchive/2000speech.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2001) (“The management of the New York 
Stock Exchange has committed that they will push hard to reinstate the time-honored, common sense 
rule that requires shareholder approval for plans that grant options or award stock to officers and 
directors, if NASDAQ does likewise. Last week NASDAQ sought input from its issuers regarding the 
advisability of this approach.”). 
 38. The NYSE was more resistant to the adoption of the Audit Rules, as is reflected in the format 
of the listing standard they ultimately adopted. See infra text accompanying notes 75, 83. Several 
influential members of the Legal Advisory Committee to the NYSE strongly questioned the need for 
the Audit Rules. See Memorandum from Martin Lipton on Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Audit Committees: Some Questions and Suggestions 
(Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with author); Memorandum from John F. Olson, supra note 37. 
 39. BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT 
COMMITTEES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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marketplaces. The BRC then issued its report, containing a series of 
recommendations. Most were addressed to the marketplaces and 
recommended changes in listing standards.40 Some were addressed to the 
accounting profession. And some were addressed to the SEC itself, 
recommending disclosure regulations that complemented or implemented the 
other recommendations. Finally, the national securities markets implemented 
these recommendations through their listing standards. 
A company that wants to have its securities traded on a national securities 
market must apply for listing on that market. Federal regulations require each 
of those markets41 to establish standards which companies must meet in order 
to qualify for trading. Noncompliance with the listing standards is grounds 
for the delisting of securities from the relevant market.42 For the purpose of 
this paper, I will limit my discussion to the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (NASDAQ).43 
There are two general types of listing standards: quantitative and 
qualitative. Quantitative standards include the size and financial condition of 
the company, the number of shareholders of the class to be traded, the market 
value of the public float, and the minimum bid price of the security.44 
Qualitative standards relate largely to matters of corporate governance.45  
The securities marketplaces have an unusual status among the regulatory 
institutions of this country. They are “Self-Regulatory Organizations” 
(SROs). This designation, included in the Securities Act of 1933,46 elevates 
the marketplaces above merely private enterprises, entitled to determine their 
own rules and membership requirements, but includes legislative and 
adjudicative authority subject to SEC oversight. This quasipublic, 
 
 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES (1999), available at http://www.nasd.com/ 
docs/textapp.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2001) [hereinafter BRC Report]. 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. SEC Release No. 33-7422 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,945, ¶ 89,709 (1997 Transfer 
Binder) (June 10, 1977).  
 42. The marketplaces have established delisting processes, involving notice periods, the 
availability of hearings, and appellate review. See NASDAQ Rules, supra note 1, at Rules 4800-4890; 
NYSE Manual, supra note 1, § 8. 
 43. At the time of the Audit Rules, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) was administered 
jointly with NASDAQ including the development and administration of listing standards. With respect 
to the other exchanges registered under the 1934 Act, no significant company’s securities are listed on 
such exchanges that are not also listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or the AMEX. 
 44. These standards are available on http://www.nyse.com and http://www.nasd.com. 
 45. The qualitative rules cover the distribution of annual and interim reports, the presence of 
independent directors, the audit committee rules, rules regarding the holding of annual shareholders’ 
meetings, requirements for shareholder approval of certain issuances of stock or adoption of certain 
stock option plans, and shareholder voting rights. See NASDAQ Rules, supra note 1, §§ 4350-51; 
NYSE Manual, supra note 1, Rule 203 & § 3. 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1 (1988). 
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quasiprivate status has enabled the marketplaces to move where the SEC can 
no longer tread in the area of corporate governance. 
Indeed, the marketplaces may be the only entities in this country which 
are able effectively to impose nationwide standards of corporate 
governance.47 The SEC has been ruled out of the business, Congress has 
never seen fit to try, and no single state has the requisite reach.48 This 
authority has never been successfully attacked.49 
III. THE AUDIT RULES 
The Audit Rules represent an essentially procedural solution to a 
substantive problem. This procedural solution is not a new way to approach 
issues of corporate governance. In the area of directors’ duties of care and 
loyalty, the legal requirements involve the process of decisionmaking. The 
directors have to be informed as fully as circumstances permit, be as 
deliberative as circumstances permit, seek outside advice as prudently 
feasible, and be free of any disabling conflict of interest which would taint 
their objectivity. The decision must be made in good faith, in the best 
interests of the corporation as a whole.50 Legal rules are poor vehicles for 
mandating outcomes in complex factual situations like the running of a 
corporation, nor are legal review mechanisms particularly suited to a 
substantive review of the outcome of the decisions made in that situation.  
Similarly, the Audit Rules require that certain steps be taken and that 
certain activities systematically occur, including, for example, the annual 
discussion between the outside auditors and the Audit Committee regarding 
the company’s accounting policies.51 However, the Audit Rules add two 
unusual elements: setting out qualifications for directors who serve on Audit 
Committees, and involving the outside auditors in specific interactions with 
the Audit Committee through the regulation of the auditors, not the company.  
 
 
 47. NYSE Manual, supra note 1, at Rule 312.03(c) and NASDAQ Rule, supra note 1, at Rule 
4350(i)(1). For example, both marketplaces require an issuer to secure shareholder approval for certain 
stock issuances (for example, twenty percent of the outstanding shares) under circumstances where a 
shareholder vote is required neither as a matter of securities law nor as a matter of state corporate law.  
 48. Even the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, reaches only to corporations 
incorporated in that state. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8. 
 49. It has, of course, been criticized. See, e.g., Michael, supra note 34. 
 50. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 51. Such review is mandated by the Audit Committee charter for the Audit Committee and by 
SAS 61 for the accountants. 
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A. The BRC Recommendations 
The BRC Report contained ten recommendations. Six were 
recommendations for changes in the marketplace listing standards, three 
were directed at new SEC disclosure requirements,52 and one recommended 
a change to Generally Accepted Auditing Principles.53 
The listing standard recommendations were divided by goal. The first two 
were “aimed at strengthening the independent of the audit committee.”54 
Recommendation One was made to the marketplaces and proposed a new 
definition of director “independence” for purposes of audit committee 
membership.55 Recommendation Two recommended that the listing 
 
 
 52. Recommendation Nine urged the SEC to require disclosure of the adoption of a charter by an 
audit committee, whether the committee “satisfied its responsibilities” under the charter during the 
previous year, a triennial disclosure of the charter itself and the adoption of a “safe harbor” from 
liability for these disclosures. BRC Report, supra note 39, at K-16. Recommendation Nine urged the 
SEC to require an annual letter to shareholders in the annual report and Form 10-K Annual Report 
from the audit committee disclosing whether or not, with respect to the prior fiscal year:  
(i) management has reviewed the audited financial statements with the audit committee, including 
a discussion of the quality of the accounting principles as applied and significant judgments 
affecting the company’s financial statements; (ii) the outside auditors have discussed with the 
audit committee the outside auditors’ judgments of the quality of those principles as applied and 
judgments referenced in (i) above under the circumstances; (iii) the members of the audit 
committee have discussed among themselves, without management or the outside auditors 
present, the information disclosed to the audit committee described in (i) and (ii) above; and (iv) 
the audit committee, in reliance on the review and discussions conducted with management and 
the outsidet auditors pursuant to (i) and (ii) above, believes that the company’s financial 
statements are fairly presented in conformity with General Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) in all material respects. 
Id. The BRC further recommended a “safe harbor” for these disclosures as well. See id. 
Recommendation Ten suggested that the SEC requires the review by a company’s outside auditor of 
the quarterly reports pursuant to SAS 71 (Interim Financial Review) before the filing of Forms 10-Q 
and that the outside auditor be required to discuss the results of this review with the audit committee. 
BRC Report, supra note 39, at 16. 
 53. Recommendation Ten urged that General Accepted Auditing Principles (GAAP) require a 
discussion between the outside auditor and the audit committee regarding the auditor’s view of the 
quality of the accounting principles applied by the company including a discussion of clarity and 
degree of aggressiveness or conservatism reflected. Id. 
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. The Committee also recommended the following: 
[B]oth the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) adopt the following definition of the independence for purposes of service on the audit 
committee for listed companies . . . .  
 Members of the audit committee shall be considered independent if they have no relationship 
to the corporation that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management 
and the corporation. Examples of such relationships include: 
•  A director being employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the current year or any 
of the past five years; 
•  A director accepting any compensation from the corporation or any of its affiliates other than 
compensation for board service or benefits under a tax-qualified retirement plan; 
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standards include a requirement for an audit committee composed entirely of 
independent directors.56 Recommendations Three, Four, Six, and Seven were 
aimed at “making the audit committee more effective” by requiring an audit 
committee composed of at least three directors, each of whom is “‘financially 
literate’” and at least one of whom has “accounting or related financial 
management expertise.”57 The recommendations further required the audit 
committee to adopt a charter specifying “the scope of the committee’s 
responsibilities, and how it carries out those responsibilities” and to review 
the charter annually.58 Recommendation Six urged that, as a requisite to 
listing, the charter specify that the authority of the audit committee derives 
from the board’s ultimate authority as representative of the shareholders for 
the selection and replacement of the outside auditor.59 The final 
recommendation directed to the marketplaces was to ensure, by requiring it 
in the charter, that the audit committee receive from the auditors a written 
statement of all its audit and non-audit relationships with the company. The 
committee would also be required to discuss these relationships with the 
auditors in order to assure the auditors’ continuing independence and 
objectivity.60  
 
 
•  A director being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has been in any 
of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates as an executive 
officer; 
•  A director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, any for-
profit business organization to which the corporation made, or from which the corporation 
received, payments that are or have been significant to the corporation or business organization 
in any of the past five years; 
•  A director being employed as an executive of another company where any of the corporation’s 
executives serves on that company’s compensation committee. 
•  A director who has one or more of these relationships may be appointed to the audit committee, 
if the board, under exceptional and limited circumstances, determines that membership on the 
committee by the individual is required by the best interests of the corporations and its 
shareholders, and the board discloses, in the next annual proxy statement subsequent to such 
determination, the nature of the relationship and the reasons for that determination. 
BRC Report, supra note 39, at 10-11, 24. 
 56. Id. at 11-12, 25. 
 57. Recommendation Three, id. at 12. 
 58. Recommendation Four, id. at 13. 
 59. The charter would have to specify the following: 
[T]he outside auditor is ultimately accountable to the board of directors and the audit committee, 
as representatives of shareholders, and that these shareholder representatives have the ultimate 
authority and responsibility to select, evaluate, and where appropriate, replace the outside auditor 
(or to nominate the outside auditor to be proposed for shareholder approval in any proxy 
statement). 
Recommendation Six, BRC Report, supra note 39, at 14. 
 60. Recommendation Seven, see id. The statement is that described in Independence Standards 
Board Standard 1. See supra note 1. 
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B. Scope of the Rules 
The BRC Report suggested an exemption from all of its listing standard 
recommendations for companies with a market capitalization of less than 
$200 million.61 It is difficult to understand this exemption, both in its 
substance and in its definition, except as a wave of the hand towards small 
business, in the same sense that the SEC has had to include a Small Business 
Impact Statement in its rules since the passage of the Small Business 
Regulatory Flexibility Act.  
Much of the systematic data cited in the BRC report to support the need 
for the Rules is based on the increasing likelihood of financial fraud in small 
companies.62 Despite the instances of earnings management, in large 
companies that Chairman Levitt discussed in his speech announcing the 
formation of the BRC, the structural impediments to the independence of the 
Audit Committee are much more prevalent in small concerns. The 
Committee of the Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) Report,63 one of the bases for these recommendations for reform, 
found that small companies were much more likely to have a strong, indeed 
overbearing, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who dominated the outside 
directors.  
The market capitalization cutoff was thus unrelated in any meaningful 
way to the problem the BRC identified in its Report. In addition, market 
capitalization is a variable thing. The $250 million threshold would have 
been at best difficult and at worst impossible to police, with companies on 
the edge of that number sliding into and out of the rule’s coverage, at 
whatever interval measured. Finally, the number took no account of any 
existing market structure such as the quantitative listing qualifications 
NASDAQ had established to differentiate between its National Market and 
Small Cap markets or between Small Cap and the Over-The-Counter (OTC) 
 
 
 61. BRC Report, supra note 39, at 23 (“The Committee also recognizes, however, that smaller 
companies may have greater difficulties meeting any enhanced standard regarding independence; 
companies with smaller market capitalizations—so-called “small cap” companies—may have 
relationships with large investors that may require greater flexibility as to board and audit committee 
membership and composition.”). In furtherance of that policy, Recommendations 1 (definition of 
director independence), 2 (audit committee to consist solely of independent directors) and 3 (financial 
literacy requirement for audit committee members) were written to apply to “listed companies with a 
market capitalization above $200 million.” Id.  
 62. Id. at 2 (letter from the Chairmen). 
 63. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Financial 
Fraudulent Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies (Mar. 1999) (on file with 
author). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss2/4
p549 Scott.doc  12/20/2001   9:15 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FUTURE 561 
 
 
 
 
Bulletin Board.64 The enforcement problems such a line presented would 
have been formidable at best.  
NASDAQ65 based its threshold on the line the SEC drew when it adopted 
the Small Business (SB) filing system. Only those companies which file their 
forms as SB filers66 can obtain any relief from the new Audit Rules. 
However, those companies are not completely exempt, but are instead 
subject only to a somewhat less burdensome set of requirements.67 
C. The Content of the Rules and the Controversies 
The Audit Rules govern the function of the Audit Committee, its 
composition and the qualification of its members. The function of the Audit 
Committee was perhaps the least controversial aspect of the 
recommendations. While there was objection to the requirement that each 
Audit Committee adopt and disclose a charter setting forth its various duties, 
those objections were comparatively muted. Objectors were concerned that a 
charter would lock the Audit Committee into taking only certain steps in a 
certain order, and prevent it from responding flexibly to urgent or unusual 
circumstances that might arise on the ground that deviation from the charter 
might itself expose directors to liability.68 In its strong form, objectors saw 
the charter as a road map for filing a complaint against the members of the 
audit committee for failing to comply with the requirements it had itself 
established for its functioning.69 However, the Rule did not mandate the 
content of the charter and various model charters addressing these concerns 
very quickly appeared. 
The basic composition concept, that the Committee be composed solely 
of at least three independent directors,70 was also by itself uncontroversial. 
 
 
 64. NASDAQ Rules, supra note 1, at Rules 4310(c), 4420 (Small Cap Market and National 
Market System). 
 65. The NYSE did not object to the BRC recommended threshold, but it is a decision in which 
the NYSE has no stake, because it does not list companies with that low level of market capitalization. 
 66. The term “Small Business Issuer” is defined in rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. § 77 (2000), to include U.S. or Canadian companies (not including investment companies) with 
both revenues and market value of the public float of $25,000,000 or less. Only Small Business Issuers 
may avail themselves of the less burdensome registration and filing requirements of the SB forms. See, 
e.g., General Instruction A to Form 10-KSB under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 67. NASDAQ Rules, supra note 1, at Rule 4350(d)(2)(C). 
 68. See Memorandum from Martin Lipton, supra note 38. 
 69. It remains to be seen whether these or any of the other liability-related fears regarding the 
Audit Rules will be borne out. To date, there appears to have been no complaints filed in which these 
Rules are named or are the source of any pleaded causes of action.  
 70. SB filers may have fewer than three independent directors on their audit committees as long 
as the committee has at least two members, a majority of which are independent under the new 
definitions. NASDAQ Rules, supra note 1, Rule 4310(c)(26)(B)(iii). 
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Both major marketplaces had already required companies to have 
independent directors on their boards, to have audit committees, and to have 
some independent director presence on that committee. However, the BRC’s 
recommended redefinition of the term “independence” gave rise to some 
issues, not all of which are yet resolved.  
The definition of director “independence” has never been firmly 
established in regulatory law. The Audit Rules presented the opportunity and 
the risk of more clearly setting out the parameters of independence for public 
companies. The two primary markets chose two very different kinds of 
defining principles.71  
The NYSE adopted a very general concept of independence, using the 
same criterion it used prior to the adoption of the audit rule: independent 
directors are those with “no relationship to the company that may interfere 
with the exercise of their independence from management and the 
company.”72 In addition, employees (or their immediate family members) of 
the company or its affiliates, or members of interlocking compensation 
committees do not qualify as independent.73 Finally, there is a catchall 
exclusion of directors with business relationships with the company.74 
However, “if the company’s Board of Directors determines in its business 
judgment that the relationship does not interfere with the director’s exercise 
of independent judgment,” then the director qualifies as independent for audit 
committee membership.75 
The NASDAQ rule takes a much different approach to the definition of 
“independent”, listing with some specificity disqualifying relationships. The 
NASDAQ approach might reflect the difference between the companies it 
lists and those that the NYSE lists. Many NASDAQ companies are smaller 
in size, less mature in history (even if very large in market capitalization), 
and often have less sophisticated advisors. Boards of directors of such 
companies may benefit significantly from increased guidance on the content 
of terms like “independence”. To the extent that there are liability concerns 
that arise from board determinations of such matters, a bright line standard 
embodied in the rules of the company’s marketplace gives the directors a 
 
 
 71. There is, of course, overlap between the marketplaces. For example, both markets reduced 
the length of time a relationship with the company is disqualifying—from the five years recommended 
by the BRC to three years. 
 72. NYSE Manual, supra note 1, § 303.01(B)(2)(a). 
 73. A director who is employed as an executive of another corporation where any of the 
company’s executives serves on that corporation’s compensation committee may not serve on the audit 
committee. Id. § 303.01(B)(2)(c). 
 74. Id. § 303.01(B)(2)(b). 
 75. Id. 
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strong claim of reasonableness when they act in conformity with those rules. 
The NASDAQ rule drew upon benchmarks already developed in related 
contexts. For example, the BRC recommended disqualification of directors 
who accept compensation from the company other than for board service or 
retirement benefits. The NASDAQ rule adopted a $60,000 floor before this 
disqualification applies, based on other SEC disclosure requirements 
applicable to executive compensation matters.76 Because companies must 
already compile data for this purpose, the new rule would involve no 
additional compliance burden. With respect to “significant” payments made 
to or from a director’s business, the NASDAQ rule adopted the definition of 
“significant” in the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance.77 The NASDAQ rules also contain an escape valve in the event 
that there is one director who might not otherwise qualify as independent, but 
whose presence on the audit committee is determined (by the independent 
directors) to be so important that it is in the best interests of the company.78 
Both marketplace rules bar a director who is an employee of an “affiliate” 
of the company from serving on the audit committee. However, the 
definition of “affiliate” is far from crisp. The definition that the SEC has 
traditionally used in various of its regulations defines an affiliate as “a person 
that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is 
controlled by, or is under common control with [the company].”79 For audit 
committee purposes, the issue of affiliate is raised most acutely with respect 
to venture capitalists. 
 
 
 76. Regulation S-K, Item 404(a); 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (1999). 
 77. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.34(a)(4) (1992). 
Payments that “exceed 5% of the corporation’s or business organization’s consolidated gross revenues 
for that year, or $200,000, whichever is more” is how the term “significant” is written in the NASDAQ 
rules. NASDAQ Rules, supra note 1, Rule 4200(a)(15)(d). 
 78. For example, a person who is no longer an employee of the company but whose employment 
ended less than three years ago, thereby disqualifying him or her under Rule 4200(a)(15)(a), supra 
note 1, may be appointed by the Board under this provision. Rule 4310(c)(26)(B)(ii), supra note 1. 
This provision might be used as well for the appointment to the audit committee of a representative of 
a venture capital firm. See discussion of affiliates infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text. Chairman 
Levitt strongly advocated this view as well: 
Quality will hone the competitive edge for all markets. Those who consider lowering their 
standards to attract more business, or who do not fully embrace transparency, should think long 
and hard before they start a race to the bottom. In an era when investors are increasingly able to 
shift their capital in and out of markets cheaply and easily, it serves us well to remember that no 
market has a divine right to investors’ capital. 
Levitt Governance Speech, supra note 37. 
 79. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Rule 144 (a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 229.144(a)(1) (1999); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1999). “Control” is also a poorly 
defined term under the securities acts. Control “means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power 
to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the 
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1999). 
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Venture capitalists are usually the initial source of outside capital for a 
small, privately held enterprise. Venture capitalist are usually, the initial 
source of outside capital for a small, privately held enterprise. There are 
arguments both in favor of and against representatives of venture capitalist 
firms sitting on audit committees. Venture capitalists are often the most 
financially sophisticated members of the Board of a new, public company. 
They often retain a large ownership stake in the company. Those factors 
weigh in favor of including such directors on the audit committee, on the 
grounds that they are knowledgeable, sophisticated, and have interests 
aligned with those of the public shareholders. However, there may also be a 
serious conflict of interest between venture capitalists and public 
shareholders.  
More often than not, venture capitalists will be looking to liquidate all or 
most of their stock position in the company,80 which gives them a strong 
interest in taking actions to keep the stock price high at the times when, and 
for the period that, they (and often founding management) are able to 
liquidate their positions or make distributions to their limited partners. Such 
an interest may align them more with management than with the public 
shareholders. Similarly, the larger the venture capitalists’ stock positions, the 
more significant the control they may exercise, again aligning them more 
with management than with the public and limiting the objectivity with 
which they would fulfill the audit committee’s functions.  
The most controversial aspect of the BRC Recommendations regarding 
the composition of the Audit Committee had to do with qualifications for 
Committee members. The BRC suggested that Audit Committee members 
each be “financially literate”81 and that at least one member have such 
background or training in financial matters that he or she is “financially 
sophisticated”.82 On its face, these requirements seem quite reasonable and 
 
 
 80. If the firm is organized as a limited partnership with a finite duration, they may also 
distribute the shares out to the partners no later than the termination date of the partnership. 
 81. The BRC Recommendation does allow for a director who is not financially literate to remain 
eligible for audit committee membership if he or she “becomes financially literate within a reasonable 
period of time after his or her appointment to the audit committee.” BRC Report, supra note 39, at 12, 
26. Both marketplaces adopted this transitional concept in their financial literacy requirements. How a 
director becomes financially literate and when that magic moment occurs remains to be determined. 
Since the marketplaces engage in many educational functions for their listed companies, perhaps they 
can develop a vehicle for this purpose.  
 82. Id. at 25. 
Because of the audit committee’s responsibility for overseeing the corporate accounting and 
financial controls and reporting . . . this committee clearly has a more recognizable need for 
members with accounting and/or related financial expertise [such that it] results in the individual’s 
financial sophistication.  
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sensible for a committee that is primarily responsible for reviewing financial 
results and conversing intelligently with both internal financial management 
and outside auditors. However, this recommendation raised a considerable 
storm of negative response.  
Commenters principally objected that any stated level of expertise 
required for committee members would simply increase the liability 
exposure of those directors. First, the qualifications requirement itself would 
result in litigation by aggrieved shareholders to determine whether a 
committee member was “financially literate” or “financially sophisticated.” 
Second, the standard of behavior for directors under both state corporate law 
and federal securities law would be substantially raised as a result of their 
stated expertise.  
The marketplaces responded to these concerns with the same differing 
approach they used with respect to the other recommendations. Both 
marketplaces adopted these requirements for audit committee members. 
However, the NYSE placed the determination of “financial literacy” and 
“financial sophistication” in the business judgment of the board of 
directors.83 The NASDAQ rule attempted to specify the content of these 
concepts by using the language of the BRC Report itself, which explains 
“financial literacy” as “the ability to read and understand fundamental 
financial statements, including a company’s balance sheet, income statement 
and cash flow statement.”84 With respect to “financial sophistication,” the 
BRC Report describes the expertise it requires to reflect the following 
criteria: 
past employment experience in finance or accounting, requisite 
professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable 
experience or background which results in the individual’s financial 
sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive 
officer, chief financial officer or other senior officer with financial 
oversight responsibilities.85 
 
 
Id. 
 83. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303.01(B)(2)(b) provides that “[e]ach member of the audit 
committee shall be financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the company’s Board of 
Directors in its business judgment . . . .” See supra note 1. Section and Rule 303.01(b)(2)(c) provides 
that “[a]t least one member of the audit committee must have accounting or related financial 
management expertise, as the Board of Directors interprets such qualification in its business 
judgment.” See supra note 1. 
 84. BRC Report, supra note 39, at 26. This language appears in NASDAQ Rule 
4310(c)(26)(B)(i), supra note 1. 
 85. Id. 
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This language also appears in the NASDAQ rule.86 
The SEC coordinated its actions in response to the BRC Report closely in 
time with those of the marketplaces,87 adopting most of the recommendations 
that the BRC Report addressed to it.88 Significantly, the SEC did not adopt 
the proposal that the audit committee include in its letter to shareholders a 
statement of its belief, based on its review of the financial statements and its 
discussions with management and the outside auditors that the financial 
statements are fairly presented in conformity with Generally Accepted 
Auditing Principals (GAAP).89 The BRC recommendation regarding a 
GAAP compliance disclosure generated enormous opposition.90 The 
comments that the SEC received convinced it that the BRC recommended 
disclosure could effectively amount to a certification by the audit committee, 
which would require an extremely sophisticated and extensive knowledge of 
GAAP by all its members. Such a high level of accounting expertise was not 
within the contemplation of the financial literacy and financial sophistication 
requirements for audit committee members.91 
Instead of the BRC proposal, the SEC adopted a more common securities 
law disclosure formulation. The audit committee must state, based on its 
review and conversations with management and the auditors, whether 
“anything has come to the attention of the members of the audit committee” 
that would make them believe that the audited financial statements “contain 
an untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary 
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading.”92  
IV. THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The development of corporate governance rules by the principal U.S. 
marketplaces under the watchful eye, if not the aegis, of the SEC, is now 
firmly established as a feature of U.S. securities regulation. Indeed, listing 
 
 
 86. NASDAQ Rules, supra note 1, Rule 4310(c)(26)(b)(i). 
 87. The Audit Rules Release, supra note 10, was dated October 7, 1999; the original NASD 
proposal was submitted to the SEC on September 20, 1999 and published for comment on October 6, 
1999. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 41982 70 SEC Docket (CCH) 16, ¶ 1747 (Oct. 6, 1999). 
 88. See discussion of BRC Report recommendations, supra notes 39-60 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Recommendation Nine, BRC Report, supra note 39, at 15-16. The NYSE proposal was 
published for comment at the same time. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 41980 70 SEC 
Docket 16 (Oct. 6, 1999). 
 90. Final Audit Rules Release, supra note 1, ¶¶ 82,886-87. 
 91. The Audit Rules Release proposals were adopted in Release No. 34-42266, supra note 1. 
 92. This familiar disclosure standard echoes the obligations of outside directors reviewing the 
portions of a registration made under the authority of an expert, most commonly the audited financial 
statements, under section 11(b)(3)(C) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
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standards may be the only currently-existing vehicle by which any kind of 
uniform concepts of corporate governance can be implemented nationally. 
The same reasons underlying this aspect of listing standards domestically 
also apply internationally. Marketplaces can have transnational reach. They 
may, depending on local law, retain some or all of their status as private 
entities, thereby avoiding the imposition of political or bureaucratic hurdles. 
The marketplaces also have a strong competitive interest in maintaining 
sound corporate governance practices as part of their identities in the global 
arena. 
 There has been a great deal of recent interest in the development of 
global corporate governance standards.93 Ministers of the twenty-nine 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
participating nations recently endorsed a report of the AD Hoc Task Force on 
Corporate Governance of the OECD, adopting a set of these principles.94 
Various other groups, including the World Bank and International Corporate 
Governance Network, are also active in the area.95 
Investors rely on the existence of these standards. The extent to which 
investors value principles of corporate governance has not been exhaustively 
measured, but the studies performed to date suggest that investors will—and 
perhaps do—pay more for good corporate governance. A McKinsey & 
Company study96 done in cooperation with the World Bank found that the 
vast majority of institutional investors surveyed97 reported that they would 
pay more for shares of stock in companies with good corporate governance 
practices than companies with comparable financials without such practices. 
Much work remains to be done on just which types of corporate governance 
rules are most important to investors and are most transportable, but Board 
composition and improved financial reporting rank highly in these recent 
statements and studies.98 
Marketplaces can and should play a key role in these developments. They 
 
 
 93. See, e.g., Symposium, The Changing Structure of Securities Regulation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 
397 (2000). 
 94. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal 
and Enterprise Affairs, Ad Hoc Task Force on corporate Governance, OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. 
 95. See, e.g., International Corporate Governance Network, Corporate Governance and 
Globalization: The International Corporate Governance Network 2000 Meeting, available at 
http://www.icgn.org/documents/NYC_2000_agenda_4-19-00.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2001). 
 96. See, e.g., MCKINSEY & COMPANY, INVESTOR OPINION SURVEY (2000) (on file with author). 
 97. Over 200 institutional investors were surveyed worldwide, of which forty percent were based 
in the United States. Id. 
 98. See also Corporate Governance, TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on Corporate Governance, at 
http://www.tiaa-cref.org/libra/governance/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2001); Governance, Issue 
No. 80 (2000) (on file with author).  
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have considerable expertise in developing, implementing, and enforcing 
corporate governance standards. Marketplaces also have a strong interest in 
bringing at least some of their basic corporate governance concepts with 
them as they expand across borders. When investors buy a share of stock 
traded on the NYSE or on the NASDAQ National Market, there are implicit 
assurances in the brand that the marketplaces should be anxious to protect. 
Brand recognition will attract investors, enhancing liquidity, and enhanced 
liquidity will attract additional listings. The marketplaces promote this brand 
recognition in their moves to open new markets, but like any other brand, 
they must be vigilant to maintain its quality.  
Corporate governance is an important part of that picture. The Audit 
Rules cannot be directly translated into non-U.S. markets. However, the 
principles the Audit Rules are meant to further—greater accountability and 
transparency in financial disclosure and oversight of the process by qualified 
and independent directors—are likely to be significant to every securities 
market.  
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